Why is Friedrich Nietzsche rated negatively

Overcoming pity with Nietzsche

content

1. Schopenhauer's ethic of compassion and Nietzsche's will to power
1.1. Schopenhauer's philosophy of suffering
1.1.1. Affirmation of the will and the circles of suffering as a result
1.1.2. Ways out of the circle of suffering
1.2. Nietzsche's assessment of Schopenhauer's doctrine of redemption and his counter-proposal under the sign of the will to power "
1.2.1. Criticism of dispassionate contemplation
1.2.2. Criticism of the compassionate morality
1.2.3. Criticism of the ascetic ideals
1.2.4. Nietzsche's counter-draft under the sign of the will to power

2. Overcome compassion
2.1. Pity in the evaluation
2.2. The dangers of compassion
2.3. Compassion and generosity
2.4. Knowledge
2.5. Overcoming compassion and compassion

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Preface

It is an interesting matter, this pity: If you talk to people about the subject of pity and their experiences with it, the overwhelming majority reports that they have a bad feeling. Even so, it is considered by almost everyone to be one of those virtues that need to be preserved the most. Compassion is seen as the great feeling that makes us human beings, that allows us to be human beings as a common humanity beyond nationalities, races and languages.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788 - 1860) saw it similarly and built his entire ethics on compassion as a foundation. The one transgresses his immediate area, overwhelms his egoism and suffers almost the same torments as the one who receives the pity - suffering shared is suffering halved. Help in itself in the world of will, striving and striving, which is otherwise characterized by instinct and egoism.

It seems all the more astonishing when one suddenly hears from Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900): Compassion is weakness! Compassion is harmful! How can you make such a statement? But that's exactly what is radical about a thinker like Nietzsche: what is tried and tested is torn down from the pedestal at eye level by him and re-examined. Regardless of whether this is the tried and tested and well-respected compassion or the relevance of God. Nothing seems sacred to him - and that is exactly why he was a thinker ahead of his time.

The question that naturally arises when considering pity can only be: Is pity a wolf in sheep's clothing? If you then think one step further and enter this thought game, which at first seems absurd, you quickly come to the next question: If this is actually the case, what should take the place of pity? Finally, the authority of feeling compassionate after such a demotion and the charge of fraud and sabotage can have no further validity.

This work will deal with these questions. The work should also show that Nietzsche did not represent a malicious misanthropic philosophy in which everyone only strives for power over others and pity is demonized per se. The aim is to show how Nietzsche is primarily concerned with the human way of dealing with compassion.

To this end, we should first take a look at Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion (1.1.) In order to be able to understand the starting point for Nietzsche's considerations and developments. Chapter 1.2. deal with Nietzsche's criticism of the passages of Schopenhauer that were decisive for the train of thought, as well as sketching his corresponding counter-drafts. The next intellectual step is then carried out in Chapter 2: Compassion is overcome and its value is assigned new, and above all new.

Overcoming pity with Nietzsche

How Friedrich Nietzsche overcomes pity and assigns the value of pity in a new way

1. Schopenhauer's ethic of compassion and Nietzsche's will to power

Fundamental differences and unmistakable similarities can be identified between Arthur Schopenhauer's and Friedrich Nietzsche's ethical drafts. When Schopenhauer died in Frankfurt am Main in 1860 at the age of 72, Friedrich Nietzsche was just 16 years old. As a student in Leipzig, he turned to Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy and resolutely defended his ideas in order to later break away from them and vehemently contrast with their creator. A large number of Nietzsche's ideas are fundamentally based on Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy on, the general view of human life and its circumstances differs, among many other aspects, but fundamentally.

Schopenhauer designs human life as a circle of suffering. At the same time, however, the philosopher of metaphysical pessimism has also been constantly looking for ways out of this circle of suffering that torments people in their lives. He found this in the doctrine of the negation of the will and the overcoming of egoism in compassion.1

Nietzsche, on the other hand, turned away from the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauser and directed his own philosophy towards the bodily vital, towards the affirmative of life. He spoke of the will to power, of liberation through self-conquest and of instinct formation instead of instinct death.2 Nietzsche sees the compassion on which Schopenhauer builds his entire ethics as a weakness and as a potential weapon - condemning it to be one of the greatest evils. Contrary to his former spiritual teacher Schopenhauer, Nietzsche did not draft any systematic ethics. However, he does develop a coherent idea of ​​morality in which pity plays a subordinate role. A morality in which compassion must rather be overcome.

In order to be able to understand the systematics and the ideological development towards Nietzsche's appeal to overcome oneself in the context of the question of pity, Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy of suffering should first be outlined and his concept of pity discussed, in order to then see how Nietzsche approached this ethical draft replies.

1.1. Schopenhauer's philosophy of suffering

For Arthur Schopenhauer, the main thing is to understand why we are and must be torn between two worlds:3 For Schopenhauer, these two worlds were one of the imagination, i.e. consciousness, intellect and spirit, and on the other hand the world of will, i.e. the world of instinctual nature, the body, the instinct-unconscious. In Freud's words one can say: the dichotomy between the ego and id.4

1.1.1. Affirmation of the will and the circles of suffering as a result

For him, this conflict between two worlds is fundamental to every human existence. The world of the will is the primary and actually real one. The world of imagination, on the other hand, is only of secondary importance.5 Our true selves, according to Schopenhauer, are behind that which knows nothing other than wanting and not wanting, as satisfaction and dissatisfaction.6 We find our true selves in the world of will.

How should one imagine the world of will, however? In Schopenhauer's philosophy there is no world as a self-contained sense structure that follows a planning creative force. Rather, he understands the world as an objectivation, an objectification, an irrational cosmic will.7 This cosmic will lets man pull in two main directions: self-preservation and procreation.

The will has people firmly in hand: It is precisely these motives of self-preservation and reproduction that spark the urge to assert oneself. This will is what separates us from one another, keeps us at a calculated distance from one another and establishes hierarchical structures. At the same time, however, it is also the one that connects us with all other people, since we are all equally pulled by the will. If man gives himself up to this will, which is precisely the case with most people, the circle of suffering characteristic of human life arises through this very affirmation of the will.8 How, however, does it come about that through the affirmation of the will man gets into a circle of suffering? The Berlin psychotherapist Günter Gödde (Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 2003) on this: ͣLife is wanting, wanting is striving, striving is an expression of lack, lack means that the will is inhibited, inhibition of the will leads to suffering. "9 However, suffering in itself does not make a person happy. If one affirms life, one strives for happiness, wellbeing and satisfaction - according to Schopenhauer, however, the opposite is achieved.10 A fundamentally pessimistic attitude towards the human pursuit of happiness: One is chasing after a chimera, a fabulous hybrid creature. The more you want something in particular, the more unhappy you become through the painful experience that you don't achieve what you want after all.

1.1.2. Ways out of the circle of suffering

Most people, according to Schopenhauer, respond to this unfortunate circumstance with the strategy of egoism, as a striving for existence and wellbeing.11 If every individual behaves selfishly, fights, wars and conflicts inevitably arise.12

As an alternative solution strategy to break out of the circle of suffering, he opposes egoism three possibilities: (a) Aesthetic contemplation (liberation from willing through acts of knowledge), (b) the morality of compassion (liberation in moral behavior) and (c) the negation of the will through asceticism (liberation through inner change).13

Under the aesthetic contemplation14 Schopenhauer understands the aesthetic distance, the rapture into a higher, spiritual world. Schopenhauer makes the difference between the subject of willing and the subject of knowing clear: while the subject of volition finds itself in finite things, that is, striving, wishing, striving, the subject of knowing is incontestable.15 If a person not only recognizes but also sets ends at the same time, he becomes willing and in turn becomes a “poorly suffering [n΁ subject of will”).[16] So he speaks out in favor of knowing for the sake of knowing. Knowledge as an end in itself without the harmful influence of strivings and purposes outside of knowledge itself, which would plunge people back into wanting and thus into the circle of suffering. Along with this, the idea of ​​aesthetics arises as futility: Aesthetics express itself when it is only about its own aesthetics and this is its own and sole purpose.

Another strategy of salvation, which is fundamental for the further train of thought, is that of overcoming egoism. In egoism, the liberation strategy of most people, the unredeemed will is most strongly expressed, according to Schopenhauer. To this he diametrically opposes compassion as overcoming it.17 In the experience of compassion, people go beyond their egoistic immediate area and take a look at the whole. He distances himself from himself, recognizes the same being in the other and suffers with him. Schopenhauer saw this process not only as an adequate response to the egoism dominated by volition, but also as a strategy to free oneself from the circle of suffering and volition: When I act altruistically, I not only have beyond my own immediate area. stepped, but rather freed me from my own selfish will.

However, Schopenhauer describes perhaps the most radical, but also the most consistent strategy of liberation in the negation of the will through asceticism, liberation through inner change. If a person experiences a “supra-individual view of the generality of suffering”, “the good person is suited to“ the pain of the whole world ”.[18] According to Schopenhauer, this knowledge should now lead to the fact that the human being recognizes the hopelessness of willing and finds himself in a redeeming change from wanting to wanting no longer. This requires the consistent denial of the will. This results in a waiver of expectations in general, but in particular a waiver of happiness expectations. As already mentioned, the pursuit of happiness, in the sense of lust, enjoyment and sensual pleasures, is rated negatively by Schopenhauer: On the one hand, because people are chasing after a chimera and on the other, because ultimately they only achieve the opposite result by wanting can: The circle of suffering, i.e. torment and pain.19 In summary, one can say that Schopenhauer is concerned with two different ways of behaving towards the will: ͣThe affirmation of the will as the main source of suffering and the negation of the will as an aesthetic [compassionate] and ascetic release from suffering. "20

1.2. Nietzsche's assessment of Schopenhauer's doctrine of redemption and his counter-proposal under the sign of the will to power

Nietzsche initially opposes the rigid division between the egoistic as bad and the unegoistic as good. This, according to Nietzsche, has led to the fact that man has changed from being an individual to becoming a dividual: He speaks of a "self-division of man".21 In DIE FRÖHLICHE SCIENCE (1882) he writes: “There is as much wisdom in pain as there is in pleasure: [… ΁ that it hurts is not an argument against it, it is its essence.”[22] It is more important to understand this essence than to condemn it a priori.

1.2.1. Criticism of dispassionate contemplation

In aesthetic contemplation, which Schopenhauer conceived of as dispassionate, Nietzsche turned primarily against objectivity. Rather, he pleads for a passion of knowing: Passion and affect should be involved in knowing.23 However, and Nietzsche warns against this, not weighted one-sidedly: This would lead to dogmatic determinations in the sense of convictions.24 Nietzsche assigns these to a different role: beliefs should not be adopted or proclaimed, but rather should be used and consumed. They are the material and shavings of knowledge; she does not submit to them.25

1.2.2. Criticism of the compassionate morality

Nietzsche is very critical of the idea that one could just as easily find oneself in the other and therefore suffer just as much. Rather, one must defend oneself against the affect of compassion, since it represents a weakness. Nietzsche contrasts Schopenhauer's altruistic motives and the effect of redemption with narcissistic and egoistic motives such as vanity and self-appreciation when it comes to suffering or even supposedly altruistic.26 In fact, according to Nietzsche, people primarily pursue unconscious, egoistic motives when they help out of pity. We make our help available above all when we - as the more powerful ones, can help, are sure of applause, want to feel our contrasts of happiness or hope to tear ourselves out of boredom by looking at it. "27

1.2.3. Criticism of the ascetic ideals

For Nietzsche, the willful breaking of one's will is a pathological matter.28 Rather, he would like to counter this negative asceticism with a positive asceticism:

"Not repression of the self, sensuality, instincts, but practice in them, not simply renunciation, but moderate interaction, not denial, but recognition and mastery of what has been denied, not flight from the world, but the seductions of worldly reality. face his and learn to behave moderately towards them. "29

Asceticism can thus be an asceticism that leads out of vitality, or it can just be an asceticism that leads into it and to its development.30 Basically, it is about the decision to turn away from life and move away from oneself, or to turn to life and accept it in its entirety and, above all, accept it. Understood in this way, asceticism is a problem of power economy, not morality.31

1.2.4. Nietzsche's counter-draft under the sign of the will to power

Nietzsche is concerned with the affirmation of all sides of this world and this life. He includes suffering as an aspect of life.32 He represents a dynamic, expansive and fun-loving will to power that takes the place of the restless, covetous and needy will to live. He puts instinct formation, instinct formation in place of instinct destruction. This is Nitzsche's formula for liberation.33 The division into two worlds, one world of imagination, the other world of will, is basically adopted by Nietzsche from Schopenhauer, but he assigns a fundamentally different function to willing: :Willing liberates: that is the true doctrine of will and freedom [ … ΁. Wanting liberates: Because wanting is creating [... ΁. "[34] By willing, people step out of the passive role of victim and shape, design and create themselves.

Nietzsche does not see people as passive, but as pro-active living beings. For people it is not about self-preservation, but rather about expansion, about growth.35 In order for a living organism, including humans, to grow, it has to overcome itself again and again. That means mastering, mastering and controlling difficulties that arise during expansion. In short: to expand and manifest one's own power.Expansion means making claims to power. And with Nietzsche this is what drives all living beings: the will to manifest one's own power - the will to power.36 However, it is primarily not about the power of one individual over the other. Rather, it is about power over oneself: one has to overcome oneself, set goals for oneself and counter the difficulties in a decisive manner in order to grow with them and thus manifest one's power. Nietzsche is concerned here with a self-determined existence as an alternative to standardized, moral existence. The individual has to free himself from morality and assert himself against violations of conventions.37 With Nietzsche, the liberating principle is not to be found in selflessness, but in overcoming oneself. It's not about self-preservation, but about self-creation.38 In the case of Schopenhauer, egoism still had to be overcome through pity, in Nietzsche it appears in a new and functionally significant form.

Nietzsche's suffering also experiences a new approach. For Nietzsche, suffering is above all knowledge. In doing so, he opposes the widespread misunderstanding of Dolorism, which is based on Christian dogmatics, and that suffering has the purpose of redemption. The consequence of this understanding is the conclusion that it is not bad to suffer because one will eventually be rewarded. The reassuring knowledge that suffering is not in vain, as suffering itself will redeem one. Nietzsche, on the other hand, dares to take an unbiased look at suffering and discovers it as an instrument of knowledge, so he deliberately gives it a purpose. One can argue that this can only be accepted, that is, internalized, in order to be understood. To work towards your own knowledge. For Schopenhauer, the origin of suffering is primarily based on the wishful thinking to be able to evaluate the world according to one's own wishes and expectations. That, Nietzsche would probably answer, is the barrier that it itself creates between me and the world. Through a knowledge-oriented distance from everything that can be influenced by me, i.e. by distancing myself from myself, I can get a sharper view of reality.39 One could also say with Schopenhauer's vocabulary: Thus I can look from the world of will into the world of imagination. Nietzsche is about to show that ultimately it is important to overcome myself in order to be me.

2. Overcome compassion

From an ethical point of view, Nietzsche argues from the perspective of life. The first question he asks when considering phenomena is whether the character in question is life-promoting, life-sustaining, species-preserving, or even species-cultivating.40 He considers it fundamentally wrong not to evaluate and classify values ​​according to their usefulness or potential for harm to life.41 In doing so, a concept of human perfection is drawn up that opposes the Aristotelian concept of virtuous moderation. In Nietzsche's ethics, the perfect person does not look for virtue, but rather for health.42

When it comes to self-creation and the classification of values ​​according to their potential use or harm and egoism is seen as purely functional and value-free, people individualize themselves in the focus of their immediate vicinity. Can there still be something like a common goal for humanity? Something that connects us? If every culture has an individually shaped view of things, individual needs and goals, what can then be a common goal of humanity? Nietzsche would probably answer that goal setting in itself is the goal of mankind. Telos as determining the tele: setting goals and purposes and thus appreciating and despising. In short: creating values.43 And according to aspects that qualify as life-affirming and life-negative.

In this way, life literally forces us to set values. From the perspective of life, the value of esteem then consequently comes to the fore, insofar as one can suggest a hierarchy in a meaningful way: According to Nietzsche, the valuation of life is the most valued of all things.44 A consistently more optimistic view of life, as well as human existence and its circumstances, than could still be heard from Schopenhauer.

2.1. Pity in the evaluation

Nietzsche evaluates every human phenomenon as a symptom of strength or weakness, as a sign of improvement in life or deterioration in life. Therefore, when it comes to the question of pity, the first question arises whether it is life-enhancing or life-worsening for people to suffer. Compassion, he says, is weakness insofar as it causes suffering. If one feels compassion, one is robbed of one's strength. It makes the suffering of the sufferer contagious and therefore contrasts with those feelings that increase our vitality.45

Nietzsche is not only concerned with those who feel pity, but also with those who suffer.46 What is the value of compassion for him? Nietzsche speaks out very clearly against pity from the perspective of the sufferer: If help is given purely out of pity, Nietzsche said, then one helps for one's own good, not for the good of the sufferer.47 This is mainly the case because an act of help deprives the sufferer of the opportunity to gain real strength in overcoming his or her suffering. This is accompanied by the request to face suffering, to accept problems as a challenge and thereby to develop into a better, stronger person.

At first glance, this sounds quite brutal and inhuman, as we usually assume that altruistic behavior is beneficial to others. Acting altruistically, however, is not possible with Nietzsche if one does it out of pity. If one helps the other out of pity, then only out of selfish motives. If we help out of pity, it is because we are sure that we will receive recognition for it and that the aid budget will have a beneficial effect on our social status. We can also experience the self-satisfying effects of the distance between our own advantageous situation and the other unfavorable situation. We recognize our own happiness through the contrast agent of the other's suffering.48

2.2. The dangers of compassion

Nietzsche's understanding of life is fundamental to understanding these lines of thought, all of which refer to the perspective of life. He conceives an understanding of life based on inequality. We are not all born the same. Life itself, Nietzsche points out, does not recognize equal rights for healthy and degenerate parts of an organism: the latter must be removed from the organism or it perishes in its entirety. The pity of the individual, Nietzsche continues, is what fuels the degeneration of the collective. This is where we have to start: The pity in the minds of the individual must be removed in order to save the collective from decline.49

However, this view does not yet reveal the full potential danger that Nietzsche sees in sympathy, since it characterizes the sufferer as a mere recipient of help. If one goes further and remembers the will to power, one can see pity primarily as a weapon for the weak. For the weakest of the weak, it is the one weapon they have left that can show that they are still alive. As a manifestation of their will to power.50 If the strong then show compassion, this means for the weak, as it were, the recognition of the one power that they will have at any time, despite their weakness: the power to violate.51

The whole organism now runs the risk of being degenerated by powerful weaknesses in that they are the ones who take control. Full control over another is always control over his or her values.52 The weak then become a danger when, through the excitement of pity, they have implemented the idea in the minds of the strong, in the face of such suffering, be it dishonorable, well-off, strong and vital.

2.3. Compassion and generosity

What alternative do we then have to the war of all against all? Can there be such a thing as compassion for strength, or perhaps even an adequate substitute in some form for compassion and being weakened?

In this context Nietzsche speaks of a bestowal virtue as an integral part of his conception of strength and health. When one shows generosity in a natural way, one draws everything in to internalize it and then pass it on as a token of love.53 However, this bestowal virtue should not be understood as compassion for strength - it is rather a substitute for compassion. The generous, so Nietzsche, does not help the weak, or almost not out of pity, but mainly out of a power-motivated drive.54 Instead of egotistically motivated helping out of compassion, he uses power-motivated generosity, which demands no consideration from the other and does not pull the helper down to the lower level of the sufferer, but rather confirms his (social) strength.

When it comes to helping, the decisive factor is not whether, but rather how. The fact that compassion, like sorrow, is an aspect of life that cannot simply be ignored is expressed in precisely this decision of how: Compassion is indeed a weakness, but also a characteristic feeling of the otherwise very strong . In order to be infected by someone else's suffering, one's own situation must be assessed as better. Although the infection of suffering soon pulls one down to the same level of suffering, one must not underestimate the stimulating effect of the superiority that was initially ascertained. In such a case, it can be an incentive to orientate oneself up and not down.55 So opting for generosity rather than help out of compassion.

The fact that compassion is a characteristic feeling of the stronger can also be illustrated by the fact that a certain learning process must have already taken place with the stronger. When one suffers, the power of the imagination is at work above all. You imagine the sufferings of the other from your own perspective. Without imagination, compassion is impossible. The compassionate person has a power of imagination that the non-compassionate does not have - that the other suffers must be learned.56

2.4. Knowledge

So this learning that the other is suffering implies having knowledge of the other's sufferings. This knowledge of the suffering of the other does not necessarily have to lead to the infectious arousal of the feeling of pity. Rather, Nietzsche is concerned with translating this knowledge about the suffering of the other into concrete action in a way that is life-promoting or at least not life-damaging for the strong as well as for the sufferer and thus for the entire organism.

Nietzsche speaks in this context of a more masculine brother of compassion.57 When a weak person suffers and arouses pity in the strong, then finds someone who suffers with them, then the pitying person can offer some kind of pity (unconsciously or consciously) by painting a generalized picture of the problem affecting the sufferer. He removes everything personal. He removes any personal involvement of the sufferer in his suffering and thus objectifies the problem. A kind of help that is only made possible through knowing, not through sympathy.

Such sensitivity is not to be confused with ordinary pity; Strictly speaking, this is exactly where the difference becomes clear: Sensitivity as empathy and willingness to give help for self-help, for the good of the organism, and pity as an affront to the sufferer and a weapon of the weak and degenerate in the organism. Nietzsche advocates a sensitivity that relies on knowing instead of pity.58

This opens up a paradox: although a person proves strength through knowledge and learning, or precisely because a person does so, he thinks he knows more about the circumstances of the other and runs the risk of suffering too. This is dangerous for him insofar as he can become infected and damage his vitality.59 So mere co-knowing cannot be the complete answer to harmful compassion.

2.5. Overcoming compassion and compassion

In order to be able to take the last mental step to overcome compassion, we have to remember how Nietzsche spoke out against dispassionate knowledge and how he is concerned with accepting and affirming all sides of life and human existence.

In order to establish true individual rank, one must be able to withstand personal suffering. In exactly the same way one could say that one qualifies as to how far one can endure suffering, how far one can extend one's responsibility. According to Nietzsche, it's not about suffering with someone, but about enduring, feeling for them.60 This compassion can be seen as a series of personal tests. The question that arises with every challenge is: How much truth can I endure? How much truth can I dare? The challenge of specific knowledge about the suffering of the other is to experience compassion with full force, but not to remain in it. Compassion then joins bravery in a corner.61 This kind of compassion needs to be developed in order to advance, develop, shape and promote life.

Hence, it is not compassion but overcoming compassion that is one of the noble virtues.62 The focus is on overcoming: compassion has to be overcome, not rejected. In the end, it cannot be repudiated because it will keep trying to take hold of us. However, if we have already overcome it, we know how to deal with it confidently. Really mastering a virtue or an emotion necessarily implies anchoring it in one's own psyche, not rejecting it.63 The decisive factor, that it has to be defended after successful internalization, is a sovereignty over compassion resulting from the sensitivity of knowing and the strength of compassion, combined with the instruction: We master compassion, not the other way around. So it is impossible to completely avoid compassion, but we must counter his dictate of suffering with a natural compassion on the basis of knowledge in order to protect ourselves, others, life and humanity.

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Abel, Günter (1998): Nietzsche: The dynamic of the will to power and the eternal return. Berlin: de Gruyter

Caysa, Volker (2000): Asketismus. In: Henning Ottmann (ed.): Nietzsche Handbook: Life, Work, Effect, pp. 195-197. Stuttgart: Metzler

Enthoven, R. (2012): Subject Joy. In: Arte Philosophy (TV broadcast). Available online i.a. on www.arte.tv

Frazer, Michael L. (2006): The Compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on Sympathy and Strength. In: The Review of Politics 68, pp. 49-78. University of Notre Dame

Gödde, Günter (2003): Schopenhauer and Nietzsche - two basic designs of the art of living. J. f. Psych., 11, 3 (2003), pp. 254-271

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1881): Morgenröthe. KSA (Critical Study Edition) 3, pp. 9-331

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1882): The happy science. KSA (Critical Study Edition) 3, pp. 343-651

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1884): Thus spoke Zarathustra. KSA (Critical Study Edition) 4

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1886): Beyond good and evil. Project Gutenberg, 2005 E-book # 7204

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1 See Gödde (2003), p. 254

2 See Gödde (2003), p. 254

3 see Safranski (1987), p. 200 in Gödde (2003), p. 258

4 See Gödde (2003), pp. 258, 259

5 See ibid., P. 259

6 See Schopenhauer (1844), p. 279 in Gödde (2003), p. 259

7 See Gödde (2003), p. 259

8 See ibid., P. 259

9 ibid., p. 260

10 See ibid., P. 260

11 See Gödde (2003), p. 260

12 See ibid., P. 260

13 See ibid., P. 262

14 "Contemplation" from Latin contemplari: "look at", "look at"; In the sense of a contemplative contemplation, which is characterized by calm and attention.

15 See Safranski (1995), p. 110 f. In: Gödde (2003), p. 261

16 ibid., p. 110 f. in: Gödde (2003), p. 261

17 See Gödde (2003), p. 261

18 ibid., p. 262

19 See Gödde (2003), p. 262

20 ibid., p. 263

21 See ibid., P. 265

22 Nietzsche (1882), p. 550

23 See Gödde (2003), p. 266

24 See ibda., P. 266

25 See Nietzsche (1882), p. 550

26 See Gödde (2003), p. 266

27 Nietzsche (1881), p. 125 f.

28 See Gödde (2003), p. 266

29 ibid., p. 267

30 See ibid., P. 267

31 See Caysa (2000), p. 195

32 See Abel (1984), p. 68

33 See Gödde (2003), p. 267

34 Nietzsche (1884), pp. 111, 258

35 See Nietzsche (1886), §13

36 See ibid., §13

37 See Gödde (2003), p.268

38 See Gödde (2003), p. 269

39 See Enthoven (2012)

40 See Frazer (2006), p. 55

41 See ibid., P. 56

42 See ibid., P. 57

43 See ibid., P. 57

44 See Frazer (2006), p. 58

45 See ibid., P. 61

46 See ibid., P. 62

47 See ibid., P. 62

48 See Nietzsche (1881), p. 125 f.

49 See Frazer (2006), p. 63

50 See Frazer (2006), p. 63

51 See ibid., P. 63

52 See ibid., P. 63

53 See ibid., P. 64

54 See Frazer (2006), p. 65

55 See ibid., P. 66

56 See Frazer (2006), p. 67

57 See ibid., P. 67

58 See Frazer (2006), p. 67

59 See ibid., P. 69

60 See ibid., P. 70

61 See Frazer (2006), p. 70

62 See ibid., P. 70

63 See ibid., P. 73